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ABSTRACT
EUROPEAN UNION - RUSSIA NATURAL GAS RELATIONS
Arınç, İbrahim Said
M.A. Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Hasan Ali Karasar, Ph.D.
September 2007
This thesis aims to analyze, the natural gas relationship of European Union and 
Russia with comparative perspective. The EU is very much dependent on Russian 
gas and this dependency is expected to increase in the following decades. On the 
other hand, the natural gas export revenues significantly contribute to Russian 
budget that makes it dependent on gas sales to Europe. Therefore, this relationship 
creates interdependence between EU and Russia. Finally, by means of analyzing 
this interdependency, this study also aims to discuss the possible contribution of 
Turkey to the future of EU-Russia gas relations. 
Keywords: European Union, Russia, Natural Gas, Interdependence, Pipeline, 
LNG, Gazprom, Turkey
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ÖZET
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ - RUSYA DOĞAL GAZ İLİŞKİLERİ
Arınç, İbrahim Said
Master tezi,Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar
Eylül 2007
Bu yüksek lisans tezinin amacı Avrupa Birliği-Rusya doğal gaz ilişkisini detaylı bir 
şekilde incelemektir. AB, Rus doğal gazına ciddi bir biçimde bağımlıdır ve bu 
bağımlılığın önümüzdeki yıllarda daha da artacağı tahmin edilmektedir. Diğer 
taraftan, doğal gaz ihraç gelirleri Rusya  ekonomisine önemli ölçüde katkıda 
bulunmakta ve bu durum Rusya’yı AB’ye doğal gaz satışına bağımlı kılmaktadır. 
Bu nedenle bu ilişki AB ve Rusya arasında karşılıklı bağımlılığa sebep olmaktadır. 
Son olarak bu çalışma, karşılıklı bağımlılığı tahlil etmek suretiyle, AB-Rusya doğal 
gaz ilişkisinin geleceği seyrine Türliye’nin olası katkılarını tartışmayı da 
amaçlamaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Rusya, Doğal Gaz, Karşılıklı Bağımlılık, 
Boru hattı, LNG, Gazprom, Türkiye
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the 21st century, natural gas is becoming one of the most strategic sources
of energy in the world. As Daniel Yergin names natural gas as The Next Prize; “it 
will have a far-reaching impact on the world economy, bringing new opportunities 
and risks, new interdependencies and geopolitical alignments”.1 Furthermore, 
natural gas is the cleanest fossil fuel in terms of CO2 emissions; it will be more 
popular in the future as a consequence of environmental issues and concerns. In the 
following years we might witness great competition over the control over natural 
gas in the world. 
In this study the natural gas relationship between the EU and Russia will be 
analyzed. In EU, Russian gas constitutes 25% of total EU gas consumption2 and 
                                                
1
Daniel Yergin and Michael Stopgard, “The Next Prize”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, Issue 6, (2003), 
p.103.
2 CERA, European Gas Watch Supply and Demand Tables, (Cambridge: CERA, 2007), p.6.
2Russian sells 58% of its total export to the EU. 3 Moreover, the EU is getting more 
and more dependent on Russian natural gas. This dependency is going to increase 
during the next ten years. How can the EU develop a diversification strategy 
without alienating Russia or risking its energy supply from Russia? On the other 
hand, how will Russia maintain its gas supplies to the EU as a reliable supplier and 
what are the major problems, options and trends of the Russian gas industry?
The main contribution of this study to the field of International Relations 
would be on the subject of economic and political stability in Eurasia. Trying to 
find a solution to the above mentioned problem would have vital importance to 
developing a “third way” satisfying both sides’ (EU and Russian Federation) 
concerns on increasing volumes of mutual dependence. That is also closely 
connected with the issues of peace and security in the region as well as the 
sustainability of good-neighborly relations. Moreover, the relationship will have a 
great impact on the development of the future global gas market.
This study is a unique approach in many respects. Firstly it employs an 
objective assessment of the mutual dependence issues by outlining the EU and 
Russia’s concerns as well as ambitions. Secondly it employs academic and 
technical sources which are expected to contribute to future studies with this unique 
method. Lastly, it is written from a point of view that not only concentrates on 
                                                
3 Cedigaz, “Statistical Database”, (Cedigaz, 2007), http://cedigaz.org/ (accessed May 13, 2007).
3political-technical and bureaucratic problems but also with concentration on 
specific actors like Russian gas giant company Gazprom.
1.1 Theoretical Framework
Since the establishment of the Soviet-Western European gas trade, this 
relationship has been considered a classical type of interdependence. Each side held 
a degree of power over the other. The Soviets were the gas supplier and the
Western Europeans were the source of the hard-currency payments and equipment 
deliveries.4 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, in their work Power and 
Interdependence, create an excellent framework with which to analyze the EU-
Russia Gas Relationship. They define interdependence as mutual dependence and 
in world politics this refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among 
countries or among actors in different countries.5 These reciprocal effects will 
depend on the type and strategic significance of the commodities that are being 
traded.6 In the EU-Russia gas relationship, it is crystal clear that the gas deliveries 
from Russia are important commodities for EU and in return huge amounts of hard-
currency are very significant for Russia.
                                                
4 Jonathan Stern, Soviet Oil and Gas Exports to the West (Hants: Gower Publishing Company,
1989), p.59.
5 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition,
(New York: Longman, 2001), p.7.
6 Keohane and Nye, p.8.
4The EU’s indigenous gas supply is expected to decline in the following 
decades. The decline in the gas production would be met by gas imports in the 
future. This situation makes the gas relationship between the EU and Russia more 
complicated. The security of the gas supply issue has become one of the first 
significant topics on the political agenda in the EU.
The Ukrainian Gas Crisis of 2006 was very significant case that forced
Europeans to reconsider the reliability of Russia as a secure supplier. The conflict 
began when Gazprom demanded a quadrupling of the price of gas it delivers to 
Ukraine via a pipeline system that extends to Europe, which experienced a 
reduction in its deliveries of Russian gas. During the crisis many European 
countries, including Germany, Poland, Hungary, France, and Italy, experienced a
5% to 40% reduction in their supplies of Russian gas.7 This case was a significant 
indicator of how European countries are sensitive to an interruption of the Russian 
gas supply. 
The terms ‘sensitivity’ and ‘vulnerability’ are critical when analyzing this 
scenario. Keohane and Nye define sensitivity “as the liability to costly effects 
imposed from outside before policies altered to try out to change the situation”8 and 
in their work vulnerability is defined “as an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed 
                                                
7 Doris Leblond, “Europe questions Russian gas reliability”, Oil and Gas Journal, Vol. 104, Issue: 
2, (2006), http://www.ogj.com/ (accessed 18 June, 2007).
8 Keohane and Nye, p.10.
5by external events even after policies have been altered”.9 In this framework, it 
could be analyzed that the high sensitivity of EU’s gas dependence on Russian gas 
forces the EU to take measures to decrease the level of vulnerability. Otherwise, the 
EU’s vulnerability to a gas crisis will have a destructive effect on EU economy and 
industry. Therefore, the EU is seeking other gas supplies from North Africa, the 
Middle East and the Caspian region to diversify its gas sources. At this point, 
Turkey holds very strategic position to secure and diversify gas supplies for the
EU. In Chapter IV and V, the EU’s options for taking the necessary measures for 
being less vulnerable to gas interruptions will be analyzed.  
Another outcome of the Ukrainian Crisis of 2006 was the use of natural gas 
as a Russian foreign policy tool in its relations with the Ukraine. The Ukraine is the 
gateway for nearly 80% of Russian gas exports to Europe. The crisis damaged 
Russia’s reputation as a reliable supplier and placed the Ukraine in the position of 
having insufficient supplies of natural gas to maintain its own gas needs. The 
problem of gas pricing by Russia allowed it to cut the supply of gas to the Ukraine. 
It was obvious that the outcomes of this crisis had been calculated before and the 
costs had been envisaged by Russia. Therefore, why did Russia behave this way
toward the Ukraine, risking its reputation in the EU? The best answer draws upon
the term ‘asymmetries of dependence’. Keohane and Nye define asymmetries in 
dependence as ‘that [which] is most likely to provide sources of influence for actors 
                                                
9 Keohane and Nye, p.10.
6in their dealings with one another”.10  In a case of a disagreement, a less dependent 
side would have fewer costly effects and thus the situation would give the less 
dependent side an advantageous position.  We will not analyze the relationship 
between Russia and the Ukraine. However, the possibility of the use of natural gas 
as a foreign policy tool is very crucial in the EU-Russia gas relationship. 
Moreover, regarding the EU-Russia gas relationship, it is significant to 
analyze the sustainability of the Russian position as a major supplier. Russian gas 
infrastructure had been constructed mostly during the Soviet period. Therefore, the 
attempts to reorganize the gas industry after the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the contemporary Russian energy policy will be analyzed in Chapter III.
Consequently, the EU-Russia gas relationship has a very significant 
position in the global gas market. The relationship of a major supplier and 
consumer may shape the future of global gas trade. The problems and solutions of 
Russia being a gas supplier to EU could affect the other producers for their further 
transactions. On the demand side, the experience of EU with Russia may be useful 
to other gas consumer countries.
It is the fact that, the interdependence of the EU and Russia may have some 
costly effects on their future. So, this interdependence should be constructed to 
satisfy both sides. On the other hand, Turkey with its strategic position and 
                                                
10 Keohane and Nye, p.9.
7dynamics may contribute to the diversification of supply for EU and the 
diversification of transit routes for Russia. 
Therefore, in order to analyze this unique gas relationship, in the following 
chapters, we will focus on the development of the Global Gas Market, the 
development of the Russian Gas Industry, and the EU gas market and analyze their
interdependent relationship. 
8CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATURAL GAS AS AN ENERGY 
SOURCE AND THE GLOBAL GAS MARKET
2.1 Introduction and a Short History of the Natural Gas Industry
Natural gas has existed under the ground for millions of years, but in the 
modern age the methods for obtaining gas, bringing it to the surface, and putting it 
to use were developed.11 Around 1785, Britain was the first country to 
commercialize the use of natural gas as it is used to light houses. In the United 
States the gas was first used to illuminate town of Fredonia, New York, in 1821. 
With the development of the oil industry and the discoveries of gas fields in1859 in
Pennsylvania led to the widespread use of natural gas in United States.12 The first 
pipeline network was constructed by the enterprising businessmen who saw the 
                                                
11
NaturalGas.org, “History of Natural Gas”, (NaturalGas.org, 2007), http://www.naturalgas.org/ 
(accessed April 20, 2007).
12 David G. Victor, Amy M. Jaffe and Mark H. Hayes, Natural Gas and Geopolitics: From 1970 to 
2040, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.5.
9possibility of transporting gas by primitive pipelines near industrial zones. The 
increasing consumption of gas led to the development of gas production 
techniques. At the end of 19th century, gas was derived from coal or oil or by the 
direct production and transport of natural gas.13
2.1.1 The First Rise of Natural Gas
The energy shortages during World War II, led the rise of natural gas usage. 
"I wish you would get some of your people to look into the possibility of using 
natural gas," President Franklin Roosevelt wrote to Interior Secretary Harold Ickes 
in 1942.14  During the war natural gas was used to meet the heavy industrial 
demands of the United States and the consumption increased by 50% in just four 
years.15 The industry realized the advantages of natural gas in many sectors of 
production during the years of war.
Before 1950, the development of natural gas industry was essentially a 
United States phenomenon. In the beginning of the 1950s, the United States 
represented 90% of natural gas production and consumption.16 In United States, the 
advances in welding, metallurgy and compression technology allowed for the 
                                                
13 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, (New York: Free Press, 
1991), p.78.
14 Yergin and Stopgard, p.104.
15 Victor, Jaffe and Hayes, p.6.
16 Victor, Jaffe and Hayes, p.7.
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expansion of the pipeline network. The transportation infrastructure had made 
natural gas easy to obtain, and it was becoming an increasingly popular form of 
energy. New uses for natural gas were discovered, making extraction and 
transportation even more viable. Generally, it is used to heat households; in 
industry, it is used for manufacturing and processing plants; it is also used to 
generate electricity.17
In Western Europe, Italy first used natural gas in its industry with the 
discovery of natural gas in the Po Valley, during the years of the Second World 
War. Later, the discovery of the Groningen gas field in the Netherlands caused an
increase of gas consumption in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and France.18
In the 1960s, the gas-rich Soviet Union adopted an industrial strategy that ordered a 
shift to gas. Moreover, the industries of the Soviet satellite states in the Eastern 
Europe were gasified with the construction of pipelines transporting gas from the 
gas-rich fields of the USSR.
2.1.2 The Second Rise of Natural Gas
The second rise of natural gas occurred during the OPEC crisis of 1970s. 
The economies of Western Europe and Japan were dependent upon imported oil. In 
                                                
17 NaturalGas.org, History of Natural Gas.
18 Victor, Jaffe and Hayes, p.7.
11
order to protect their economies against the negative outcomes of the oil crisis, the 
diversification of energy sources was inevitable. The countries most reliant upon
oil found natural gas the best alternative. Technically speaking, the substitution of 
oil with natural gas was must appropriate choice that did not need fundamental 
changes in the infrastructures and the industries of those countries. Besides, natural 
gas is easy to manage and cleaner than coal and oil. In particular, Japan made great 
efforts to increase the share of natural gas in its primary energy consumption.19
The shift to gas became easier with the development of the pipeline 
industry. In the 1980s, major pipelines linked Canada to United States, the Soviet 
Union to Eastern and Central Europe, Norway and the Netherlands to other 
Western European countries, and Algeria to Italy under the Mediterranean Sea.20
The pipelines created two giant gas markets- North America and Europe. However, 
the transportation of gas by pipelines is limited to physical and economic 
conditions and distances. 
2.1.3 The Development of LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas)
Although the gas is generally transported via pipelines, LNG offers more 
practical solutions for transportation. LNG promotes economical gas trading over 
                                                
19 Victor, Jaffe and Hayes, p.8.
20 Victor, Jaffe and Hayes, p.9.
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long distances and creates a flexible business model that enables easier trade of 
natural gas in the world market. 
In 1914, the first technique for liquefying natural gas was invented. At that 
time, the aim was the storage of gas. In the 1960s, the technology for shipping 
LNG was developed and the first commercial LNG cargo was exported from 
Algeria to both the United Kingdom and France.21 During the oil crisis in 1970s, 
the LNG demand increased and LNG facilities were developed in Algeria and 
Indonesia. By the end of 1970s, Japan was the world’s largest importer of LNG,
mostly imported from Indonesia. In the following decades, Malaysia, Australia, 
Qatar, Nigeria, Trinidad & Tobago and Oman became the major LNG producers. 
In 1990s, the deregulation and privatization of natural gas in the world gas 
market made LNG a more flexible, competitive and entrepreneurial business. 
Therefore, it is not necessary to sell LNG via long-term contracts and spot sales of 
LNG became possible. The first regular spot LNG cargo shipped from Australia to 
Spain in 1993.22 The share of spot LNG sales is developing and the international 
gas trade is becoming more flexible and liquid. 
                                                
21 Yergin and Stopgard, p.105.
22 Victor, Jaffe and Hayes, p.12.
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2.2 Natural Gas in Global Energy Market
The significance of natural gas is increasing in global energy markets. 
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), Natural gas accounts for 
approximately 20% of world’s total energy demand.23 Natural gas is an economic 
fuel in comparison to other hydrocarbon fuels. Regarding the ecological concerns, 
it has the least impact on the environment among other hydrocarbon fossil fuels. 
Therefore, in the future, as a result of its economic, ecological and technical 
advantages, the share of natural gas in primary energy consumption is expected to 
increase. IEA foresees that gas will have the largest rate of increase (2%) among 
other energy resources in the following decades.24  
The worldwide proven natural gas reserve is 181.46 Trillion Cubic Meters 
(TCM).25 Moreover, the proven reserves are expected to be enough to meet the 
demand for at least 60 years.26 More than two thirds of the world’s gas reserves are 
found in the regions of the Middle East, The Caspian Sea region and Russia, among 
which Russia (27%), Iran (15%) and Qatar (14%) are the most important gas 
                                                
23 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2006, (Paris: OECD, 2006), p.67.
24 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2006, p.66.
25 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2007, (London: 2007), http://www.bp.com (accessed July 
12, 2007), p.22.
26 CIEP, The Future of Gas: Will Really Meet Expectation, (The Hague: The Clingendael 
International Energy Programme, 2004), p.4.
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reserve holders.27 On the quantity basis, Russia has the largest reserves of gas with 
47.65 TCM. Secondly, Iran holds 28.3 TCM gas reserves. 
In 2006, the worldwide total gas production was 2.8 TCM. Russia produced 
612.1 billion cubic meters (BCM). On the demand side, the largest consumers are 
located on North America, Europe and finally Asia-Pacific. The USA is the largest 
consumer with the consumption of 619.7 BCM of gas in 2006.28 After the USA, the
European Union is the second largest consumer with 504.7 BCM of gas 
consumption in 2006.29 The largest gas producer, Russia, also is a giant consumer 
that consumed 432.1 BCM. Another gas consuming region that increased its 
consumption sharply in the recent years is the Asia-Pacific region. The total 
consumption of Asia-Pacific was 438.5 BCM in 2006.30
2.2.1 The Natural Gas Market Structure
The gas markets differ from each other in their level of development. Some 
markets have already matured, like the United States or Japan, and in some other 
                                                
27 CIEP, Tomorrow’s Mores: International System, Geopolitical Changes and Energy, (The Hague: 
The Clingendael International Energy Programme, 2004), p.30.
28 BP, p.27.
29 CERA, European Gas Watch Supply and Demand Tables, p.2.
30 BP, p.27.
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states, like India or China, the gas markets are still developing. In the European 
Union, there are both mature markets and developing ones.31  
However, the power sector plays the key role in the development of the gas 
market. Currently, the power sector accounts for more than half of the increase in 
primary gas demand worldwide. According to the IEA, the share of gas for power 
generation is expected to increase in the future (Figure 2.1). On the other hand, the 
power sector has another significant role that has the feature of absorbing the extra 
gas supplies that are produced or imported. 
Figure 2.1: World Primary Natural Gas Demand by Sector
Source: IEA World Energy Outlook 2006
                                                
31 CIEP, The Future of Gas: Will Really Meet Expectation, p.7.
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2.2.2 Transportation of Natural Gas: Pipelines and LNG
In the global gas market, the transportation of gas is vital. The pipelines are 
the traditional transporters of the gas. The gas is transported by pipelines in local, 
national and continental systems. In some parts of the world, the natural gas usage 
is limited by the reach of pipelines. In these regions, the limitation of physical 
conditions may deprive natural gas of playing its potential role.
When the pipelines are insufficient to meet the demand, the solution seems 
to be the widespread use of LNG. LNG allows the plentiful gas reserves to be 
efficiently carried to consumers. Also, LNG has the advantage of being carried in 
tankers that can respond to sudden shifts in gas demand or prices.32 However, the 
share of LNG in the global gas trade is very low. In 2006, the LNG share of the 
international gas flows was approximately 24%.33 Despite the developments in 
LNG shipping technology, LNG shipping is still more expensive than oil 
shipping.34 It is believed that the development of the LNG market could cost as 
much as $200 billion worldwide, and energy companies will have to choose 
between investments in LNG and other investments.35 Nevertheless, it is expected 
                                                
32 Yergin and Stopgard, p.103.
33 Cedigaz, The 2006 Natural Gas Review: Cedigaz’s First Estimates 2006, (Paris: Cedigaz, 2007) 
http://cedigaz.org/  (accessed May 13, 2007), p.5.
34 “The Future’s Gas”, Economist,Vol.372, Issue 8390, (2004), pp.53-54.
35 Yergin and Stopgard, p.103.
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that the higher prices of natural gas will incite energy actors to invest in LNG 
business.36
2.2.3 The Supply and Demand Security of Natural Gas
Energy security is defined as “the availability of sufficient supplies at 
affordable prices”.37 The energy dependent countries have concerns about their 
dependence on their imports, while the energy exporting countries focus on the 
security of demand in order to secure their revenues.
In energy security, the security of gas supplies is becoming a major issue. 
The natural gas trade faces many risks regarding the interruption of supply, which
could be dangerous for both suppliers and consumers. In order to establish a secure 
gas trade, the relationships between major gas suppliers and consumers must be 
able to create new geopolitical considerations.38
The system forces suppliers and consumers into a long term mutual 
relationship of significant dependence. Regarding natural gas specifically, it has 
very expensive investment costs and a very complicated supply chain: huge, 
specific investments have to be made for facilities that produce gas and transport 
                                                
36 Economist, pp.53-54.
37 Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, Issue 2, (2006), p.81.
38 Victor, Jaffe and Hayes, p.4.
18
that gas from a specific gas field to a specific area of consumption for a long time.39
Therefore, on the supply side, the measures should be taken to secure the demand 
to maintain a safe export transaction. On the demand side, in order to mitigate the 
risks, the consumers could pursue security of supply policies that can either be 
aimed at a reduction of the dependence on imported fuels or at an increased 
diversification of suppliers.40
2.2.4 The Significance of the EU-Russia Gas Trade in Global Energy 
Market
The most significant gas relationship in the world is the gas trade between 
Russia and the EU. In 2006, 131.8 BCM of natural gas we carried out by pipelines 
from Russia to Europe.41  The EU is dependent on Russian gas at roughly 25% of 
its total energy consumption42 and Russian exports to EU constitute 58% of its total 
export.43 This creates big concerns in EU circles because such a large dependence 
on Russian gas can risk the economy of the member states. So, EU officials and 
governments of the member states are trying to seek a solution to mitigate these 
risks and secure the energy sector of the union.
                                                
39 CIEP, The Future of Gas: Will Really Meet Expectation, p.5.
40 CIEP, The Future of Gas: Will Really Meet Expectation, p.6.
41 BP, p.31.
42 CERA, European Gas Watch Supply and Demand Tables, p.6.
43 Cedigaz, Statistical Database.
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In contrast, the gas export revenues of Russia constitute a very important 
portion of its economy. An important reason for Russia’s dependence on Europe is 
its dual gas-pricing policy in which low revenues from internal gas supplies are 
subsidized by much higher European gas prices.44 This pricing policy makes 
Russia, to a significant extent, dependent on revenues earned from exports to 
Europe. On the other hand, Russia aims at reasserting state control over its strategic 
resources and gaining a position to have dominance over the main pipelines and 
markets in the world, especially in the EU.45
2.3 Conclusion
Natural gas, with its economical, technical and ecological advantageous 
features, is expected to be one of the most significant fuels in future global primary 
energy consumption. The first rise of gas usage during World War II and the 
second rise of gas usage during the OPEC crisis of the 1970s have proven that 
natural gas would be the best choice for hydrocarbon dependent economies. 
Moreover, the increasing energy-related environmental concerns in the world may 
trigger the huge amounts of global gas consumption. The development of LNG 
may enhance the global gas market, reaching consumers without pipelines. 
Therefore, the relations between the supplier and consumer countries may have 
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affect global economic and political relations. In this context, the EU-Russia gas 
relationship and interdependence holds a unique position to determine the future 
relations of suppliers and consumers. 
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CHAPTER III
NATURAL GAS IN RUSSIA
3.1 Introduction
Energy resource rich Russia holds the largest natural gas reserves, which 
are estimated at around 47 TCM and constitutes nearly 27% of the world total.46
With its huge reserves, Russia is a major energy actor. However, this situation 
makes Russia more dependent on energy exports. Natural resources constitute 
around 80% of Russian exports, and oil and gas account for 55% of all exports, 
making the budget mainly dependent on the energy sector.47 According to the 
World Bank, higher oil and gas prices are the primary sources of higher federal 
revenues of Russia.48
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In order to benefit from the high energy prices, Russia needs to export more 
gas to sustain its economic development. According to the IEA, Russian gas 
production will rise from an estimated 608 BCM in 2003 to 655 BCM in 2010 and 
898 BCM in 2030. Net exports are expected to rise from 169 BCM in 2002 to 182 
BCM in 2010 and 274 BCM in 2030. These projections take into account increased 
imports from Central Asia, which will make possible higher exports to Europe. It is 
expected that Russia will still be the world’s biggest gas exporter in 2030.49
Therefore the Russian state is extremely supportive of its energy companies, 
especially the Gazprom.
3.2 The Development of the Natural Gas Industry in the Russia
In the EU-Russia gas relationship, the development of the Russian gas 
industry since the Soviet period, the evolution of the gas industry after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, and the current trends of the Russian gas market are very 
significant when analyzing the main pillars supporting the Russian gas industry. 
Moreover, this analysis is expected to give a better understanding of the
sustainability of supplying the EU. 
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3.2.1 The Soviet Union and the Establishment of the Natural Gas 
Industry
Natural gas was first used for the lamps on Aptekarsky Island in St. 
Petersburg in 1819.50 At the end of the nineteenth century, the gas was widely used 
for lightning in the major cities of Russia. In Russia, until 1950s, natural gas 
production was very low. At that time, most of the gas produced was by-product 
gas from oil production and refining, and until the Second World War this gas was 
not utilized in industry, except in the Baku area.51  The first long distance natural 
gas pipeline was commissioned in 1946. The 845 km length between Saratov and 
Moscow should be considered the birth of the modern Russian natural gas 
industry.52 Despite some limited developments in gas industry, the job-intensive 
hydropower and coal dominated industrial system impeded the utilization of gas 
under the Stalin administration in the 1940s and 1950s. 
In the beginning of Khrushchev era, the goal of catching up to the United 
States played the major role in generating a movement to use modern fuels in 
Soviet industry. Oil was Khrushchev’s first focus, but gas also had a prominent role 
in his modernization desire. Developing a gas industry was officially inserted into 
the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-1960) and advanced with Seventh Five-Year Plan 
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(1959-1965).53 In the beginning of the 1960s, it was not believed that natural gas 
would play an important role in the Soviet economy. Since the mid-1960s, the 
Ministry of the Gas Industry (MGP) has had uncertain growth of gas production 
and unmet targets.54 In the following years, the Soviet administration invested in
long-distance pipelines and gas fields in the northern Caucasus, Ukraine, Volga-
Ural region, Central Asia and Western Siberia. 
In the late 1950s the total output was 5.8 BCM; more than half of the 
production was from the Volga-Urals and Ukrainian fields. When it was decided to 
expand output, firstly the fields in the Northern Caucasus and the Ukraine
developed.55 In Northern Caucasus, gas production increased with the development 
of the oil industry. The discovery of the North Stavropol field with 230 BCM
reserves in 1951 led to the first separate development of the gas industry. The 
production from Stavropol field and other middle-size fields on the Northern 
Caucasus fostered the construction of the Central Pipeline System, carrying natural 
gas from the North Caucasus north to Moscow. At which time, a “28-inch, 790-
mile pipeline [was] completed in 1956 and the capacity of [the] system was 
expanded to carry more than 30 BCM a year in the early 1960s”.56 The Northern 
Caucasus-Moscow system was extended to Leningrad in 1959.
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Another early gas producing region was the Carpathian district in the 
Ukrainian SSR. There had been production of non-associated gas in the region 
since 1940. Following significant investments in the region, production increased 
to 2.9 BCM in 1955. A 20-inch 800-mile line to Moscow was completed in 1949, 
and an 860-mile line of diameters ranging to 32 inches was laid northward, 
reaching Minsk in 1960, Vilnius in 1961 and Riga in 1962.57
The development of the Shebelinka field with its 530 BCM of reserves 
made the Ukraine the Soviet Union’s principal gas producing region in the 1960s 
and 1970s.58 At that time, the transmission system of the Ukraine was developed 
and gave opportunity to generate the first significant exports of gas to Eastern and 
Western Europe.
Although Saratov was one of the early gas producing regions of the Soviet 
Union, until the discovery of the Orenburg fields in 1966 the Volga-Ural region 
was in third place after the North Caucasus and the Ukraine. The discovery of the 
Orenburg field, with explored reserves of 1,792 BCM, was important not only for 
the increase of total gas production, but for its favorable location near 
economically-based parts of the Soviet Union.59  The development of the Orenburg
field was envisaged in three stages, each would have an ultimate capacity of 15 
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BCM. The first two stages were planned for the domestic market and the third stage 
was for feeding the export pipelines to the west. 
The Central Asian region emerged as a potential gas producer in the 1950s. 
The Central Asian reserves were developed after the fields of the North Caucasus 
and the Ukraine and before the West Siberian fields. Two Central Asian republics,
Uzbek SSR and Turkmen SSR, were involved in this development. In Uzbek SSR, 
the production began in the 1960s and peaked at an annual output level of 36-37 
BCM in 1970s. Turkmen SSR had larger reserves and production reached 70 BCM
annually in 1970s.60 The Central Asian-Central Russia pipeline was commissioned
in the 1970s with a capacity of 68 BCM. With the new pipeline extensions, the 
length of the Soviet gas pipeline network rose from 42,300 km in 1965 to 67,500 
km in 1970 and after another five years the length of the pipelines increased to 
99,200 km in 1975.61
However, the major role in the increase of the production of the Soviet 
Union was the discovery of the super fields –Medvezhe, Urengoy, Yamburg and 
Zapolyarnoye – in Western Siberia in the mid to late 1960s.62 These super fields 
represented a total of 10.000 BCM, or nearly 40% of the Soviet Union’s reserves. 
They had huge reserves: Urengoy, discovered in 1966, had 3,900 m3; Yamburg, 
1969, had 2,500 billion; Zapolyarnoye, 1965, had 2,000 billion, and Medvezhe, 
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1966, had 1,550 billion.63 These were followed in the 1970s by the Yamal 
Peninsula fields (in particular Bovanenko and Kharasevey). The new discoveries 
changed the natural gas map of the Soviet Union. 
Despite the discovery of the immense gas reserves in Western Siberia and 
the Yamal Peninsula fields in 1960s and 1970s, the realization of the “big gas 
campaign” had been delayed by mainly three reasons. The first reason was the 
reluctance of the leaders of the gas industry to invest in the new gas fields of 
Western Siberia. The gas industry leaders considered Siberian gas too expensive to 
develop and to ship.64 The second was the lack of labour facilities in the region, 
which caused a shortage of working power. In gas field cities such as 
NovoUrengoy, many people were living in portable dormitories and small huts 
because apartments were not available.65 Another reason was the need for huge 
transmission pipelines and powerful compressor stations were not only too 
expensive but also beyond the capacity of Soviet heavy industry at that time. Soviet 
industry could not yet supply appropriate infrastructure either in the necessary 
quantity or quality, so the unpleasant prospect of massive imports of equipment
was added to the list of deterrents to a “big gas” policy.66
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In the early 1970s, with the first oil crisis, the need to invest in Western 
Siberia came to the Soviet leaders’ agenda again. Their aim was to increase natural 
gas production in order to substitute oil with gas in the domestic market. In the 
Soviet Union, the majority of power plants were designed to burn both fuels.67
Soviet leaders invested heavily in Western Siberian gas development and pipeline 
construction. With the development of the First West Siberian gas fields and the 
construction of large-diameter transcontinental pipelines, gas became “a star 
performer”.68 Between 1975 and 1980, natural gas increased its share in the Soviet 
energy balance from 21.8 to 27.1 % with Siberia providing 92 % of the growth.69 In 
the following years, Soviet leaders hoped to increase the natural gas production by 
nearly 50 % over the five-year term. 
In 1970s, the industry’s reluctance to invest in Siberia gave the industry 
very little time to make preparations for the big gas campaign. Nevertheless in the 
beginning of the 1980s the machine building industry was ready with the necessary 
compressors, pipe, and other equipment.70 During this period, the giant pipelines 
and compressor stations were built to transmit Siberian gas to the European USSR 
and Western Europe. In the second half of the 1980s, the gas production is 
increased from 643 BCM in 1985 to 859 BCM in 1990.71
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On the other hand, the Soviet gas campaign met with similar outcomes as
the extensive oil production policy of the Soviet Union. The higher and higher 
output targets of the gas industry planners played a major role in exhausting these
super fields. The extensive gas production from the fields prematurely has 
endangered the future gas outcome from the Western Siberian fields.72 Moreover, if 
the big gas policy of 1980s would begin earlier, there could be less production 
pressure on the Siberian oil industry.73
3.2.2 Natural Gas Exports to the West during the Soviet Period
Until 1974, the Soviet Union was a net importer of natural gas as a 
consequence of its deliveries from Iran and Afghanistan.74 Because of the decline 
of the indigenous production, the Soviet Union signed an agreement with Iran in 
1966 providing for the importation of Iranian natural gas. The gas imports were 
begun in 1970 and reached 9 to 10 BCM a year in the middle of the 1970s.75  The 
flow of Iranian gas was planned to increase further in the 1980s under the terms of 
a trilateral agreement concluded in 1975 and involved Iran, the Soviet Union and 
three Western European countries (Austria, West Germany and France). According 
to the agreement, an additional 13 BCM of Iranian gas would enter the Soviet 
                                                
72 Gustafson, p.141.
73 Gustafson, p.180.
74 Stern, Soviet Oil and Gas Exports to the West, p.31.
75 Dienes and Shabat, p.75.
30
Union starting in 1981, and the Soviet Union would re-export 11 BCM to the West 
European partners. However, in the late 1970s, the Soviet leaders saw a greater 
benefit to exporting their own gas to Europe rather than re-exporting Iranian gas.76
Although the Soviet Union re-exported some Iranian gas to Europe in the 
1970s, the Soviet gas was consumed by western consumers as well. The first export 
transmission system through Czechoslovakia, known as the Bratstvo (Brotherhood) 
system, was opened in 1967. It carried gas from the West Ukrainian fields to 
Czechoslovakia.77 Later a small extension linked the system to Austria and the first 
gas export delivery from the Soviet Union reached a West European country in 
1968.78  Another pipeline extension linked the system with Poland. The Bratstvo
system was expanded in 1974 and began to generate exports through 
Czechoslovakia to East Germany, West Germany, Italy and Finland. The 
developments of the Orenburg fields and the construction of a pipeline to transport 
gas from Orenburg to the Bratstvo system diversified the source of exports to the 
West in 1978. At that time the designed capacity of the enlarged Bratstvo system 
was about 28 BCM annually.79
In 1980, the Soviet Union exported 57.6 BCM to Western European 
countries. In the following years, the exports to Western Europe expanded and 
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pipeline extensions to the European system enabled Russian gas to reach France. It 
was announced that West European gas companies were negotiating with the 
Soviet gas export company Soyuzgazexport to construct new pipelines with a 
capacity of 40 BCM annually.80
3.2.3 The First resistance to Soviet Gas Expansion and US Sanctions
However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, created great 
dissatisfaction among western leaders. The relations of the Soviets with the West 
had also deteriorated due to the martial law imposed in Poland. The energy 
sanctions of the United States initiated under the Carter administration and 
enhanced by Reagan planned to limit the oil and gas export income of the Soviet 
Union. The logic behind the sanctions not only involved economic concerns but 
also the possibility of gas becoming a weapon to be used against the western block. 
Furthermore, the Soviet Union would be restricted from importing some machinery 
equipment that was vital for the oil and gas industry from western countries. 
However, the natural gas issue provided a test of the US sanctions and 
demonstrated the difficulty of sustaining the anti-Soviet coalition of Western states.  
Despite the US sanctions, the West German Ruhrgas started negotiations with its 
Soviet counterparts to construct new pipelines to carry Soviet gas to Europe that 
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would expand Russia’s export capacity.81 In addition, this agreement with the 
Soviets included the upstream investments to develop the giant Urengoy gas fields 
in northwestern Siberia. In exchange for gas, German banks would supply capital 
and German firms would provide pipe and compressors. However, the US 
sanctions prevented the Germans from giving compressor technologies to the 
Soviets. The threat of the project’s cancellation led the Soviets to develop their own 
compressors and the pipeline was commissioned in 1985.82 The Soviet exports to 
the West (Germany, Italy, France, Austria, Turkey, Finland and Switzerland) 
increased from 31 BCM in 1985 to 63 BCM in 1991. Despite the ineffective US 
sanctions, German and French gas companies established another coalition of 
Western investors to expand Soviet gas exports with another pipeline (STEGAL),
which began operation in 1992.83
In 1980s, American politicians and authors blamed the German and other 
European leaders who negotiated with the Soviets for the pipeline for being 
financers of the Soviet devil. Some aspects of this criticism can be found in Erik v. 
Kuehnelt-Leddihn’s article, published in the National Review in 1980. It states that
some European states were feeding the Soviet devil in terms of hard currency and 
technology. In the article, the author claimed the Soviet use of slave labor in the 
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pipeline that was constructed because of the partnership with West Germany.84 On 
the contrary, some Europeans saw the gas deal as an opportunity to ensure peace 
between the West and the Soviet Union. Generally it was believed that the Soviet
policies would become more moderate and peaceful as a result of a higher level of 
trade and economic interdependence with the West.85
In the end, the US sanctions could be considered a failure. In 1982, the 
editorial article of the Nation journal revealed the result of the sanctions: “the 
Soviets were still in Afghanistan and the Europeans were still insisting that they 
had right to trade wherever they want”.86 But, the lasting feature of the US 
sanctions could be felt through the limitation of the Soviet gas deliveries in Europe. 
After studies and long discussions within the framework of the IEA, the importing 
governments agreed to avoid unnecessary dependence upon any one source of gas, 
which meant that Soviet gas should constitute no more than 30-35% of the total gas 
supplies in any West European country (but especially West Germany, France and 
Italy). 87
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3.2.4 Reorganization of the Russian Gas Industry after the Dissolution 
of the Soviet Union
Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the energy exports were limited by 
the Western Alliance in order to limit high profits from energy goods from the 
Soviet economy. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the rapprochement with 
the West gave Russia the chance to be a major gas supplier. 
However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union had three effects on its gas 
deliveries to the West. The first change was the dissolution of the Iron Curtain 
states in Europe from the Soviet bloc. The Soviet pipelines were mostly located in 
these newly independent countries and that situation created uncertainty for future 
gas deliveries. The second change, which was more dangerous, was the creation of 
politically separate states within the Soviet Union itself.88 In 1992, the European 
part of the Soviet Union disintegrated into seven states (Russia, Belarus, the 
Ukraine, Moldova, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia). The Ukraine and Belarus were 
the main transit countries of Soviet gas exports to the West. In 1992, 90 % of 
Russian gas was transported through Ukraine.89 The third change was the economic 
crisis that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Due to the economic 
shockwaves, the internal demand for Russian gas declined dramatically from 480 
BCM in 1990 to 400 BCM in 1995. The gas production also declined from 640 
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BCM in 1990 to 595 BCM in 1995.90 Clearly the decline in the production was 
lower than the decline in the internal demand. Therefore, the large and growing 
surplus of natural gas would be a great opportunity for Russia to become the largest 
gas export country and to earn extra hard currency to finance its economic 
development.
The need for the reorganization of the gas sector was inevitable in order to 
realize that potential. The Soviet Gas Ministry had been responsible for the 
coordination of all production and transmission of gas. After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, this entity was reorganized in 1989 into a joint stock company with 
the assets divided among Belarus (1.5%), Ukraine (9.5%) and Russia (89%). In 
Russia the State Gas Concern Gazprom was established by the RF Presidential 
Decree of November 5, 1992. In 1993, under the RF Government Directive, the 
State Gas Concern Gazprom was transformed into the Russian Joint Stock 
Company Gazprom.91 At the time, Gazprom was founded, 100 % of the company’s 
shares were owned by the Russian Federation. The sales of shares started in 1993 
and ended in 1995. After the sales in 1995, the state owned 41 % of the total. In 
1990s, the managers of the Gazprom intended to retain the control over gas 
production, transmission and marketing in order to keep monopoly profits for 
Gazprom. As a result of these efforts, Gazprom obtained control over 
Soyuzgazexport -- the state entity responsible for marketing all gas exports -- and 
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consolidated control over most of the gas exports.92 Moreover, the managers of 
Gazprom aimed at making Gazprom an indispensable firm for the Russian 
economy and society by maximizing its profits. Gazprom was financially 
consolidated by acquiring many assets varying from agricultural lands to banks.  
Another financial source of Gazprom is the control over the pipelines and the 
natural gas producer prices are regulated at low levels. 
3.3. Natural Gas Market in Russia and Gazprom:
Natural gas constitutes 55% of the Russian primary energy demand.93
However, Russian state plans to reduce the share of natural gas to 48% in 2010 and 
45% in 2020.94 Russia’s total gas supply was 687.4 BCM in 2004. Gazprom
produced nearly 80% of the total gas supply and the rest of the gas was imported 
from Central Asian republics and independent producers. On the internal demand 
side, Russia had a huge consumption equalling 401.9 BCM in 2004.95 The biggest 
share of consumption is power generation (Figure 3.1). On the export side, the total 
export to customers was 208.5 BCM in 2004.96 The major consumers were the 
European countries that imported 120.1 BCM of Russian gas in 2004.97
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Figure 3.1: Russian Natural Gas Consumption by Sector
   Source: CERA
3.3.1 The Natural Gas Fields and Production:
Gazprom, the world’s largest natural gas producer and exporter plays the 
most important role in the Russian gas market. It holds 55% of Russia’s natural gas 
reserves. Gazprom’s reserves are the most significant commercial reserves in 
Russia.98 According to Gazprom, they hold more reserves than Iran or Qatar. The 
rest of the reserves belong to independent gas producers. The oil companies like 
TNK-BP, Lukoil and Surgutneftegaz and gas companies like Itera and Novatek are 
the major independent gas producers.99
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The major fields of Gazprom are located in Western Siberia (Urengoy, 
Yamburg, Medvezhye and Zapolyarnoye), the Yamal Peninsula (Bovanenkovskoye
and Kharaseveyskoye), Barents Sea (Shtokman), Southern Russia (Astrakhan) and 
the Volga Region (Orenburg).  These fields of Gazprom are in production or being 
prepared for production. The Urengoy, Yamburg, Medvezhye and Orenburg fields 
are in decline. The Zapolyarnoye and Astrakhan fields are close to maximum
production levels. The Yamal Peninsula and Barents Sea fields are not fully 
developed yet.100
Nearly 70% of total Russian gas production comes from Western Siberian
fields of Gazprom.101 However, the gas production is declining every year, a total 
average quantity of 22 BCM, in the Urengoy, Yamburg and Medvezhye fields. 
These fields produced 365 BCM gas in 2001. According to Cambridge Energy 
Research Associates (CERA), in 2020 the total production of these fields will be 20 
BCM.102 In order to compensate for the decline in Western Siberian production, an
increase of gas production is expected from the giant field, Zapolyarnoye, and 
smaller fields Kharvutinskoye, West Tarkosalinskoye, Pestsovoye, Yen-Yakhinskoye
and Yeti-Purovskoye.103
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The fields of Yamal Peninsula and Barents Sea are viewed as alternative 
options of Gazprom for future large scale supply.104 However, the cost of 
production and transportation to markets are substantial factors that may affect the 
development of the fields in these regions. The development of current fields and 
finding new sources are crucial for Gazprom to maintain or increase its production 
for domestic supply and exportation. 
3.3.2 The Russian Natural Gas Market Structure
Gazprom is located in the centre of the Russian gas industry in which the 
third party access to the transmission system is restricted and the tariff system is 
designed in favour of the system operator.  Gazprom owns and operates the 
national network of high-pressure inter-regional gas pipelines, which, at around 
152.800 km, is the longest in the world. It is the sole owner of gas storage sites in 
Russia, operating 24 underground facilities.105 Gazprom has a monopoly on all gas 
exports outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and holds a 
monopoly on gas processing in Russia, making it the only buyer of the gas 
produced by Russian oil companies and independent gas producers.106 With the 
support of the Russian state, Gazprom tightly controls the infrastructure of the gas 
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sector. The lower prices and uncertain access to the pipeline prevented most 
independent producers from entering the market.107
Gazprom also plays a central role in the Russian economy, providing up to 
a quarter of the federal government’s tax revenues. Every day Gazprom supplies 1 
billion rubles to the budget of the Russian Federation. In 2004, the total volume of 
gas supplied to distant foreign countries exceeded 140 BCM, which brought in US 
$ 18 billion in revenue.108 It is clear that in both the short and medium terms,
increasing gas export volumes and rising oil prices will bring more revenues to 
Gazprom and the Russian government
Moreover, Russia has a dual pricing policy. The low revenues from 
domestic gas prices are subsidized by much higher European and, to a less 
significant extent, Commonwealth of Independent States gas prices.109  It could be 
said that the system favours Gazprom as a financially strong global gas giant, but 
there are two problematic aspects with the pricing system. 
The first problematic aspect of pricing policy involves the Russian domestic 
market. Russia is a very large country and the transportation of gas, especially from 
Western Siberia, causes price differences between zones. The expensive production 
and transmission costs together with the low industrial gas prices caused a great 
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financial loss for Gazprom in recent years. In the period of 1999-2003, Gazprom’s
loss has been calculated at around 25 Billion USD.110 Another problem is the non-
payment of gas for households. Gazprom does not have any right to cut off the 
supply to force the customers to pay. More significantly, despite the concerns about 
the decline in the major fields and increasing domestic demand, the low prices have 
incited the Russian people to consume wastefully. Therefore in December 2006, 
Russian state approved a price liberalization program which would increase gas 
prices in 2008–10 for non-household consumers.111
The second problematic aspect of the gas pricing policy is the dependence 
on gas exports to the EU. Russia has significant financial profits in gas sales to 
European countries. This dual-pricing policy makes Russia more dependent on gas 
sales to Europe.112
3.3.3 Russian Natural Gas Exports
Gazprom sells gas to Europe via its Gazexport company. Mainly there are 
three types of gas sales from Gazexport: direct sales, sales by subsidiaries and joint 
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ventures and sales by intermediaries.113 The direct sales are carried out by the local 
companies that have direct links to Gazprom (like SlovRusGaz in Poland). The 
subsidiaries and joint ventures (like Wintershall Erdgas in Germany) have indirect 
links with Gazprom; it receives gas from Gazexport and sells to retailers in their 
countries. The intermediaries are the companies (Itera) that have a direct link to 
Gazprom and sells gas to retailers (Emfesz of Hungary) in Europe.114
Europe is the key export market for Russian gas. Gazprom supplies around 
one-third of Western Europe’s gas imports. The largest importers of Russian gas 
are Germany, Italy, Turkey and France. With these four major consumers, Russia 
exports to 28 countries: Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic,
Poland, Austria, Finland, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, 
Greece, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Bosnia, Macedonia, the UK, Belarus, 
Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Armenia and Ukraine (Figure 3.2).
Gazprom carries out major construction projects in order to strengthen and 
diversify Russia’s gas export routes and markets. Europe’s increasing demand 
urges Russia to develop these projects. Therefore, the rising gas demand in Europe 
is expected to be the primary reason for increasing Russian gas exports in the 
following decades.
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Figure 3.2: Natural Gas Exports to Europe
Source: Gazprom
3.3.3.1 The Gas Pipelines and Projects
The Russian gas is transported to Europe via the Blue Stream Pipeline 
(%3.39), the Yamal-Europe Pipeline (%16.27) and pipelines in the Ukraine 
(%80.34). 115 The export pipelines from Ukrainian territory are extended to the 
west and south. The western branch transports gas via Slovakia to Europe and via
the southern branch to the Balkans and to Turkey (Map 3.1).
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Map 3.1: Russian Gas Export Routes
Source: Osrodek Studiow Wschodnich Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW/CES)
The Yamal-Europe Gas Pipeline (YAMAL-1), currently under operation
since 1999, links the Yamal gas fields with Western Europe. The annual capacity of 
YAMAL-1 is 30 BCM per year. The pipeline transports gas from Russia via 
Belarus and Poland to Germany (Map 3.2). Moreover, there are plans to expand the 
pipeline from Poland to Slovakia and Central Europe. This proposed pipeline is 
called the YAMAL-2 pipeline.116
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Map 3.2: Yamal-1 Pipeline
Source: Gazprom
Another gas pipeline project is the Northern European Gas Pipeline 
(NEGP) or Baltic Pipeline. Gazprom and two German companies (E.ON and 
BASF) are planning a to construct a pipeline with a capacity of 28 to 55 BCM, 
which would run under the Baltic Sea from the Russian coast near St. Petersburg to 
the German coast, and possibly on to the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.117
The Yuzhno-Russkoye field is expected to fill the NEGP (Map 3.3). However, the 
construction of the NEGP has been criticized by some EU officials as another route 
that would make the EU more dependent on Russian gas. Therefore, Marina 
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Sisoyeva and Natalya Timakova emphasize that the EU concerns over NEGP may 
make the construction impossible.118
Map 3.3: Northern European Gas Pipeline (NEGP)
           Source: Gazprom
The Blue Stream pipeline supplies gas directly to Turkey across the Black 
Sea. The capacity of the Blue Stream pipeline is 16 BCM per year.119 It is planned 
to extend the Blue Stream via Turkey to the Mediterranean Sea. An LNG Terminal 
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in Ceyhan on the Mediterranean coast of Turkey would be constructed120  or the 
construction of an under-sea pipeline would connect the Blue Stream pipeline to 
Israel.121
Turkey is also considered as a transit alternative to the Ukraine and Belarus 
for Russian gas supplies to Europe. The expansion of the capacity of the Blue
Stream Pipeline or construction of a Blue Stream-2 pipeline would transport 
Russian gas via Turkey to Europe by the Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector.122
However, the objections of the USA and some EU countries to the extension of 
Blue Stream to Europe have forced Gazprom to make an agreement with Italian gas 
firm ENI. According to the agreement they will construct a pipeline with a capacity 
of 30 BCM under the Black Sea connecting Russia with Bulgaria.123
As an export alternative to Europe, the Asian energy market is becoming 
important for Russia. Especially, China, India and Japan are the potential 
consumers. However, the most prominent energy-hungry state is China. According 
to Oil and Gas Journal, China’s current natural gas supply comes entirely from 
domestic production. Between 1990 and 2004, the average annual growth rate of 
China’s natural gas consumption was 6.6%. That is faster than the growth of its 
primary commercial energy consumption as a whole. As a result, the share of 
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natural gas in the primary commercial energy consumption rose to an estimated 
2.8% in 2004 from 2.3% in 1990.124 In the future it is expected that the increasing 
gas demand in China will continue. In the beginning of 2006, Russia signed gas 
sales agreements with China in order to construct a gas pipeline to the border of 
China. The IEA forecasts that Russian gas exports to Asia will reach 30 BCM by 
2030.125 However, Russia has a similar problem with China as it does with the EU. 
China does not want to be excessively dependent on Russia and seeks to diversify 
its future energy supplies from Central Asian republics.126
Gazprom needs to increase its production to fulfill its long-term aim of 
increasing European and Asian sales. According to the IEA, Russian exports to the 
European Union are projected to climb to 137 BCM in 2010 and 155 BCM in 2030. 
In 1997, Gazprom began importing natural gas from Turkmenistan to help fulfill its 
supply contract with its European costumers. Turkmenistan's agreement with 
Russia guarantees initial natural gas exports of 6 BCM in 2005, significantly 
increasing to 68 BCM in 2007, and remaining at 80 BCM from 2009 to 2028.127
The price of gas is 29 USD per thousand cubic meters that is very below the 
Gazprom’s gas sales price to Europe. The difference between the Turkmen price 
and Gazprom’s sales price the huge amount of profit will contribute to the budget 
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of Russia. This agreement may allow Gazprom to delay the development of its own 
expensive reserves in the Yamal and Arctic regions. This situation may also reduce 
Gazprom’s need to buy gas from independent Russian producers. Furthermore, this 
agreement is expected to eliminate Central Asian producers as competitors for sales 
to Europe and other export markets, since most of their production will be 
transported to Russia. 
3.3.3.2 The LNG Export Option
Another alternative for export is sales in the form of LNG. It is expected 
that LNG exports to Asia from Sakhalin-2 will start in 2008. The other LNG 
exports are envisaged for the reserves on the Yamal Peninsula and in the Shtokman
field in the Barents Sea. However, the costs would be very high because of the 
extremely harsh climate. Therefore, the IEA assumes that no LNG projects other 
than Sakhalin-2 will start before 2030.128 The Sakhalin-2 project will construct a 
facility with the capacity of 9.6 million tones of LNG. The major market for LNG 
from Sakhalin-2 is expected to be Japan.
3.3.4 Gazprom in Europe
Gazprom is the largest Russian foreign investor. The investments are mostly 
located in Europe. The main goal of Gazprom is to boost its share in the European 
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gas market from 27 to 33 %.129 Therefore, Gazprom is willing to acquire firms in 
Europe in order to secure its supply deliveries. Europe is the core market for 
Gazprom and simply wants more access to gas distribution in Europe. Gazprom
invests mainly in the gas trade, transport, transit, distribution and storage sectors.130
Moreover, Russia has expansion plans in Austria, Belgium, the UK, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, the Baltic States, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Poland, Slovakia, Turkey, the Ukraine, Romania, Belarus, Asia, the Middle East 
and the USA.131 (Map 3.4). Although there are some exceptions, the monopolistic 
structure of Russian gas market restricts European gas companies from investing in 
Russia.
The European governments are not keen to be more dependent upon Russia
and there is some resistance against Russian investments in the gas sector. The 
Centrica incident is a very prominent case for understanding the response of UK 
officials to the expansion of Gazprom. In 2006, Gazprom attempted to buy 
Britain’s biggest gas distributor, but British competition regulators had proposed to 
change the takeover rules to block Gazprom from dominating the British market. 
Gazprom responded with “attempts to limit Gazprom's activities in the European 
market and politicization of the gas supply question would not meet with good 
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results”.132  However, Andrei Milovzorov in his article states that the acquisition of 
Centrica by Gazprom would be profitable for both sides. A distribution company 
would simply strengthen its position in the UK gas market with the support of a 
global gas supplier.133
Europe’s energy commissioner Andris Pielbags stated that Europe will 
continue talks with Russia about gas supplies, but the bloc is also keen to look 
elsewhere to satisfy its energy needs. He added that any ruling on Gazprom's 
acquisition attempts in Europe would be determined by normal competition rules. 
He emphasized that “Competition should prevail in the market. It's quite normal for 
Russia to look to diversify customers and for us to look to diversify suppliers.” 134
On the other hand, the USA is not comfortable with the increasing Russian 
dominance in the European gas sector. For instance, in April 2006, during her visit 
to Greece, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned the Greek government 
to reject a proposal by Gazprom to participate in a Turkey-Greece Interconnector. 
The US wants both Turkey and Greece to reduce their reliance on Russian gas 
supplies.135
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Map 3.4: Gazprom’s Expansion Plans
Source: Osrodek Studiow Wschodnich Centre for Eastern Studies
President Putin responded both to the USA and the EU:
"We constantly hear about some threat of dependence on Russia and that 
Russian companies should have limited access to the energy market, when 
people come to us, it is investment and globalization, but if we plan to go 
somewhere, then it is already the expansion of Russian companies".136
                                                
136 Catherine Belton, “Putin Steps Up Gazprom Defense”, The Moscow Times, April 28, 2006 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/ (accessed June 21, 2006).
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The expansion of Gazprom in Europe would increase the level of 
interdependence between the EU and Russia. But, the expansion would be limited 
by nationalistic attempts of European governments to protect their gas markets 
from Russian dominance. On July 10, 2007 the European Parliament adopted a 
resolution which emphasized that that any company from outside the EU may buy 
energy infrastructure in Europe if there is reciprocity with that country. 137
Moreover, the imbalance in the investments of Russia and the EU in their gas 
sectors would cause some serious dependency problems in the EU gas market. On 
the other hand, the attempts to limit the Russian expansion in Europe may 
discourage the future Russian gas projects. For instance, whenever a problem 
occurs between the EU and Russia, Gazprom threatens the gas companies in the 
EU that it will shift its focus from Europe to the Chinese market.138
3.3.5 Russia’s Energy Strategy to 2020
The Russian Parliament adopted The Energy Strategy of Russia for the 
Period to 2020 in August 2003, which reveals the government’s strategic thinking 
about the evolution of the energy sector and provides a framework for future policy 
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and regulatory actions. It forecasts trends in energy production and demand and 
identifies the main challenges facing the sector. These include: mobilizing
investments in production and export capacity; restructuring the gas, electricity and 
coal industries; limiting the social impact of energy-price rises; and improving 
energy efficiency.139
Specifically, the aim of the strategy document for the gas sector is to create 
a stable Russian gas industry that is economically effective and uninterrupted to 
meet the domestic and foreign gas demand.140 Moreover, it is emphasized that the 
integration of the gas networks within the Russian Federation is expected to serve 
connecting new gas production fields to the gas infrastructure.141 On the other 
hand, the liberalization of the Russian gas market is perceived to increase the 
profitability of the gas sector. 
Therefore, there are some duties in the document given to the Russian state 
to reach the above mentioned goals such as  increasing efficiency in the production 
and transportation of gas, decreasing the economic costs of gas production and 
transportation, minimizing the losses during the production and transportation 
phases of gas, the development of new gas fields in Eastern Siberia, Yamal 
Peninsula, Eastern Russia and on the eastern coasts of Russia (the most prominent 
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one is considered to be Sakhalin Island), development of technology in the gas 
sector and the development of gas transportation sector for diversification of gas 
supply from new fields.142
The strategy document also provides information about the future gas 
production scenarios. In the optimistic scenario, the gas production is expected to 
be 645-665 BCM in 2010 and 710-730 BCM in 2020.143 In the pessimistic 
scenario, the gas production would be 635 BCM and 680 BCM in 2020.144
Although the independent producers are encouraged to invest in gas production, the 
strategy document gives a central role to Gazprom. In the scenarios, Gazprom
would increase its gas out put and may produce 80% of the total production in 
2020.145
In general, there are some factors that may determine the future gas 
production between the levels of the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. The 
factors that would affect the production are given as the future rate of the domestic 
gas demand, the pricing policy of the Russian state, the volume of future 
investment in the gas sector, the dynamics of the liberalization process and the 
reform of the gas sector. 146 A more specific factor that would determine the future 
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production is the decline rate of the Western Siberian fields, which have a major 
role in the current production, and the compensation of this decline with the future 
production from new fields in the Yamal Peninsula and the Northern Sea.147
On the other hand, the necessary measures should be taken by the Russian 
state to protect the profitability of the gas export incomes by pursuing long-term 
effective policies. More specifically, the strategy document underlines that the 
interdependence with European countries is very significant and Russia should 
protect its interests with long-term contracts.148 According to CERA, Russia may 
export 160-165 BCM of gas to Europe in 2020.149 Nevertheless, the relations with 
FSU countries should be maintained to import gas supplies with long-term 
agreements on an equal basis considering the interests of both sides.150
In order to increase gas exports, the strategy document encourages
decreasing the use of gas in the electricity sector in favour of other sources.151
According to the World Nuclear Association, Russia is planning to increase its 
nuclear capacity from 21.7 GWe to 49.3 GWe in 2020 with 25 new nuclear 
reactors. Nuclear power is expected to increase to 25% in total Russian power 
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generation by 2020 and the gas share in power generation is expected to decline
from current level to 28%.152
In general, the document gives detailed information about the Russian 
state’s perspective of its future strategy. The reorganization of the Russian gas 
industry is envisaged not only to meet the future energy demand, but also to 
strengthen the Russian economy by securing future energy exports as well. In this 
respect, the natural gas deliveries to European countries play a strategic role for the 
Russian economy and it is expected to increase its importance in future. 
On the other hand, the Russian state and the strategy document have been 
criticized by Yuriy Batalin, the head of Russian Gas and Oil Constructers Union. In 
his article, Batalin emphasizes that, despite the major role of gas in Russian 
economy, a long-term economic strategy for Russia to use the huge export revenue 
efficiently is lacking. Therefore this situation may endanger the realization of the 
necessary investments to decrease the dependence on volatile energy prices.153
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3.4 Conclusion
Russia, with its immense gas reserves, is the major natural gas supplier of 
the world. However, Russia has some structural problems in its gas industry. The 
old infrastructure and declining fields are inherited from the Soviet Union and need 
to be reconstructed and rehabilitated. The construction of new gas transportation 
pipelines and the development of new gas fields seem to be inevitable in order to 
maintain the unique position Russia has in the global gas market. Moreover, Russia 
tries to control Central Asian republics to feed its export supplies and makes efforts 
to prevent the transportation of Central Asian gas by alternative routes to Europe.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the reorganization of the gas 
industry, the establishment of Gazprom and the regulatory issues of the internal gas 
market have had significant impact on the economic and efficient use of natural 
gas. The domestic pricing policy and the measures to decrease the losses in the 
internal transportation system are considered as the priorities of the Russian gas 
market.
The dependency on gas export revenues forces Russia to establish strong 
ties with consumers, especially the EU. In this context, the expansion of Gazprom
in Europe aims to secure future gas demand that would increase the level of the 
interdependence between the EU and Russia. However, the EU has serious 
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concerns about Russian intentions in Europe as it constructs new pipelines and 
acquires gas facilities because it will force them to be more dependent on a single 
supplier. On the other hand, Russia is seeking to diversify its export routes by 
constructing new pipelines to Asian markets and by developing LNG facilities. 
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CHAPTER IV
NATURAL GAS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
4.1 Introduction
Energy is necessary for the European Union to function. Historically,
energy has played a very important role. The energy issue was the one of the major 
elements that brought the member states together to sign the Coal and Steel Treaty 
in 1952 and the Euratom Treaty in 1957. 
Currently, the European Union is one of the biggest energy markets of the 
world. However, the energy sector of the EU primarily faces the problems of 
environmental issues (increasing greenhouse emissions), the competitiveness of the
energy market and the security of the energy supply. Natural gas has a very 
significant position with the potential to shape the future EU energy market.
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4.2 Primary Energy Consumption of EU
According to IEA, in 2003 EU energy consumption broke down as follows:
oil 43%, natural gas 24%, nuclear 14%, coal 13%, hydroelectric 4% and other 
renewables 2%. IEA expects the EU’s primary energy demand will grow by nearly 
0.7% every year in the period covering 2002-2030.154 While the share of coal and 
nuclear power are expected to decrease in primary energy consumption, the share 
of natural gas and renewables are expected to increase in 2030155 (Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1: The Fuel Shares in the European Union
Source: IEA WEO 2004
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The EU’s primary energy consumption is very much dependent on energy 
imports. The main suppliers are the OPEC countries and Russia.  The EU’s 
dependence on imported crude oil and natural gas is gradually growing.156 The 
import percentage of the EU’s energy is expected increase from 50% to 71% by 
2030.157  In the EU’s primary energy consumption projection by the IEA, the need 
for energy imports is expected to become more crucial in future. 
4.3 General Natural Gas Outlook of EU
The establishment of the European gas market on a large scale was started 
in 1959, with a major discovery in the Netherlands.158 In the 1960s and 1970s, the 
availability of abundant and cheaper gas supplies promoted the development of gas 
transmission and distribution infrastructure in Europe.159 The convenient economic 
situation and the competitive pricing of natural gas resulted in strong demand 
growth, which included domestic production in other EU countries such as Italy, 
Denmark and Germany. In the following years the indigenous production was 
supported with the imports from Norway, Russia and Algeria.
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In 2006, according to CERA, the natural gas market of the EU consumed 
504.7 BCM.160 The gas is consumed in EU in the sectors: Residential and 
commercial (37.5 %), Industry (29.1 %), Power generation (29.3 %) and others (4
%).161 In gas consumption the most strategic sector is the power sector. According 
to the IEA the power sector will determine the increase of consumption in the 
future,  the share of the power sector in gas consumption is expected to increase 
3.7% per year to 2030162 (Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2: Gas Demand in the European Union by Sector
Source: IEA WEO 2004
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4.4 The Natural Gas Supply and Demand of the EU
The European Union is a net importer of natural gas. In 2006, the natural 
gas proven reserves of the EU were nearly 2% of the world’s total163 and the total 
supply of natural gas in EU was 511.1 BCM.164 The EU’s indigenous production 
was 208.6 BCM, the imports were 377.1 BCM and the exports were 74.6 BCM.165
The major indigenous suppliers are the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands. In 2006, the indigenous supply came from the Netherlands (50 BCM) 
and the UK (6.2 BCM).166 According to the IEA, the total EU gas production is 
expected to decrease to 225 BCM in 2010 and 147 BCM in 2030, respectively.167
However, the natural gas demand is estimated to increase within the EU in the 
following decades. According to IEA, the share of gas imports in the region’s total 
gas demand is expected to rise from 49% in 2002 to 81% by 2030. Rising demand 
and the declining indigenous production are projected to result in an increase of 
imports, from 233 BCM in 2002 to 342 BCM in 2010 and 639 BCM in 2030 
(Figure 4.3).168 A significant portion of the future gas imports is expected to be met 
by the additional LNG imports.
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Currently, Russia, Norway and Algeria are the main import suppliers for the
EU. According to CERA, the EU imported 118.7 BCM from Russia, 85.3 BCM 
from Norway and 56.4 BCM from Algeria in 2006.169 The total LNG imports were 
57 BCM in 2006. 
Figure 4.3: Gas Supply Balance in the European Union
Source: IEA WEO 2004
4.5 The Future Significance of Natural Gas for the EU
According to The Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP), in 
the next 50 years, Europe needs an uninterrupted and increasing supply of fossil 
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fuels to create a sustainable energy economy.170 Among other fossil fuels, natural 
gas offers the least environmental hazard. According to the European Commission, 
80 % of the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which are the cause of climate 
change and air pollution, are generated by energy consumption in the EU.171 In the 
communiqué of the European Commission on “An Energy Policy for Europe” it is 
emphasized that the energy policies of EU are not sustainable and if the necessary 
measures are not taken immediately, CO2 emissions would increase by nearly 5 % 
by 2030.  Moreover, in January 2007, The European Commission proposed an 
integrated energy and climate change package to cut the CO2 emissions for the 21st 
Century. In the commission package it is stated that the energy demand should be 
reduced by 20 % by the year 2020.172
However, as a result of the economic growth of the EU, the energy needs 
are expected to increase within the next 50 years with the growth of demand 
ranging from 0.5 to 1.5 per year.173 In the memo it is also underlined that the 
greenhouse gas emissions should be reduced by 20% and renewables should make 
up 20% of the EU’s primary energy demand.174
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Although the share of renewables are planned to increase, the share of oil 
and gas is also expected to increase in the following decades.175 Therefore another 
positive feature of gas is its easy substitution for other fuels. In the EU energy 
sector, between 1991 and 2003, there was a trend of substituting coal with natural 
gas because of high coal prices.176 As a result of high oil prices and environmental 
concerns, many fossil-fuel power plants are already gasified.
Nevertheless, the gas infrastructure is considered as the most convenient 
system for the use of hydrogen in the future.177 Therefore, natural gas is presented 
as “the bridge fuel” for a sustainable energy system. Therefore, natural gas has a 
strategic position because of its features of being relatively clean and economically 
preferable.
4.6 EU Natural Gas Market Integration and Liberalization
In order to fulfill the necessary requirements to use gas efficiently and 
economically, the integration and liberalization of the gas market became 
inevitable. In general, the integration of the EU energy market is perceived as a
similar process to the Monetary Union; there will be a shift of policy making from 
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member states to the EU level. The aim of the integrated energy market is the 
organization of production, transportation, processing and distribution.178
The directives of the European Parliament of 1998 and 2003 generally aim 
to achieve a competitive, secure and environmentally sustainable gas market.179
The benefits of the creating a reorganized gas market are given as efficiency gains, 
price reductions, better standards of service and increased competitiveness.180
On the other hand, the European Commission is using many instruments to 
reorganize the future of the gas industry. The most prominent one is the legal 
unbundling. The goal of legal unbundling is the separation of vertically integrated 
gas companies into transmission operators, supply and marketing companies.181
Moreover, this separation gives an opportunity to all customers to purchase gas 
from any supplier. Therefore, the market would have efficient, competitive and 
non-discriminatory transmission and distribution. 
The EU gas market liberalization process changes the very structure of the 
EU gas market quite dramatically. However, as a result, opportunities will be given 
to new actors to enter the gas market on a non-discriminatory basis and this would 
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complicate the sustainable solution of the security of supply issue. Despite the 
ongoing liberalization process of the EU market, the gas markets of the gas 
suppliers are far from the EU level of liberalization. This imbalance between the 
EU and suppliers on liberalization levels will meet some problems in future. The 
major supplier of the EU, Russia, does not favor this liberalization. The deputy 
Chairman of Gazprom, Alexander Medvedev, pointed out that “EU liberalization of 
the gas market may disrupt entire system of gas security in the region”.182  On the 
other hand, the major gas companies of the EU are against true competitiveness in
the gas market, underlining that the strong companies like Gazprom of Russia may
guarantee the security of supplies.183
4.7 EU Natural Gas Supply Security
Helmuth Waisser, in his article “The security of gas supply-A critical issue 
for Europe”, classifies four kinds of security of supply dependence for the EU:
source, transit, facility dependence and structural risks.184 In November 2000 the 
European Commission issued a report named Green Paper: Towards a European 
Strategy on Energy Supply Security. This report carried a strong warning about 
European source dependence on imported energy, which could increase from 50%
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in 2000 to 70% in 2030.185 In 2030, the imports are expected to be supplied from 
Russia (33%), Africa (27%) and the Middle East (17%).186
The transit dependence of the EU is the issue of being dependent to the 
transit countries that are located on the route of gas import pipelines from Russia. 
The majority of these pipelines are located in Eastern Europe. The dependence on 
transit states threatens the security of gas deliveries to the EU. For instance, the 
Ukrainian crisis of 2006 demonstrated the significance of the transit states. On the 
other hand, the gas supply transmission, storage and distribution system of the EU 
is mostly established by monopolies of member states and this structure gives very 
little flexibility that will create facility dependence.187 If one element of the system 
is to fail for any reason, the gas market will face serious problems. 
There are also structural risks that endanger the security of the gas supply. 
In the EU, the gas is mainly transported via pipelines, which makes the system less 
flexible to operate efficiently. Although a pipeline system poses transit security 
issues, LNG doe not have such a problem. 188 LNG has minor risks of 
transportation problems in contrast to pipelines. As well, the development of new 
LNG facilities in Europe could be considered as a good sign of system flexibility. 
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In the given sorts of dependence, the question remains as to which level of 
mechanisms the EU should be dealing with the security of supply issue. The 
liberalization of the EU gas market transfers the responsibility from governments to 
market players.189 Previously, the old monopolistic system enabled states to deal 
with the security problem. However, with the liberalization process the market 
players are getting the prime responsibility for securing the gas supplies. The main 
concern occurs with the question of how business units will manage the prime 
responsibility when the necessary financial burden of additional security of supply 
costs decreases the profitability of the business. Therefore, the necessary measures 
to mitigate the risks of the security of the supply should be taken at the national 
governments and EU level. The European Parliament and the Council of Ministers 
passed agreements stressing the importance of minimizing the enormous risks of 
dependency for the European Union and its member states.190
However, with the accession of new member states from Eastern Europe in 
2004, the dependence on Russia has increased accordingly. The diversification of 
supply for the new members is limited due to the fixed infrastructure and the 
connections with the gas industry in Russia.191 As a consequence of the EU 
enlargement, the vulnerability of the EU to a disruption of gas supplies is growing 
dangerously. As in 2004, the European Commission has released its Directive on 
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Security of Gas Supplies; in this document it is underlined that member states have 
to define the role and responsibilities of the market players and to set up minimum 
security-of-supply standards.192
4.8 A Common EU Energy Policy and Security of Supply
Nevertheless, another issue for securing the gas supplies is the common 
vision of the member states. In this vision a certain degree of freedom should be 
given to member states, while there might be a binding authority over the members 
to regulate the mechanisms. CERA defines this structure as the common European 
energy vision through a process of regulation that is “in concert”.193
In 2006, the Commission issued a Green Paper titled A European Strategy 
for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy. The aim of the Green Paper was 
to underline the need to develop a new, common European strategy for energy, and 
whether sustainability, competitiveness and security should be the core principles 
to strengthen the strategy. It is believed that a coherent external policy is essential 
to deliver sustainable, competitive and secure energy. It would be a break from the 
past, and would show the member states’ commitment to common solutions to 
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common problems. For this reason, in order to establish a common external policy,
the European Commission declared the necessary actions:
 “Identifying European priorities for the construction of new 
infrastructure necessary for the security of EU energy supplies.
 Developing a Pan-European Energy Community Treaty.
 A new energy partnership with Russia.
 A new Community mechanism to enable rapid and co-ordinated 
reaction to emergency external energy supply situations impacting 
EU supplies.
 Deepening energy relations with major producers and consumers.
 An international agreement on energy efficiency”.194
After the negotiations within the EU, more concrete steps were taken by the 
Commission. In 2007, the European Commission released a communiqué titled An 
Energy Policy for Europe mainly aimed at creating a common energy policy for the
EU. The communiqué defined a new European Energy Policy that is ambitious, 
competitive and long-term; this policy should also provide benefits for all 
Europeans.195 Specifically, the security of supply question has been underlined as a
common issue for the EU. According to the communiqué, the members should take 
necessary measures for the limitation of EU’s external vulnerability to imported gas 
and oil.196
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On the other hand, it is emphasized that the level of solidarity among the 
member states is not sufficient to mitigate these risks.197 More cooperation among 
the industrial and political entities of member states is necessary to decrease the 
vulnerability level of the EU to gas disruptions or crises. According to CERA, a 
common energy policy will promote the development of alternative sources, energy 
efficiency, the diversification of supply and storage in order to mitigate the risks of 
supply disruptions.198 These possible developments within the EU market may 
decrease the vulnerability level and may facilitate negotiations with Russia about
gas issues under better circumstances.
4.9 Conclusion
Since the first agreements establishing the European Union had been 
signed, energy played a very significant role for integrating member states. 
Moreover, among other hydrocarbon sources, natural gas is the most prominent in 
primary energy consumption. In order to increase efficiency and competitiveness, 
the liberalization of the EU gas market is in progress. Despite the achievements in 
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liberalizing the gas market, there are some problems for the shift of energy policy 
from member states’ levels to the EU level. 
On the other hand, the decline in the indigenous production in EU member 
states and increasing import dependence upon Russia endangers the security of gas 
supplies. Therefore, the EU is trying to develop a common energy policy to 
negotiate with Russia on a stronger basis. Moreover, with a common energy policy 
the EU may take necessary measures to diversify its gas supplies from Middle East 
and Caspian region via alternative routes such as Turkey.
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CHAPTER V
THE ANALYSIS OF THE EU-RUSSAIN INTERDEPENDENCE
AND ALTERNATIVES FOR THE EU
5.1 Introduction
The EU is Russia’s most important trading partner and source of foreign 
investment. The EU’s main objective is to engage with Russia to build a real 
strategic partnership, founded on common interests and shared values, to which 
both sides are committed in the relevant international organizations.199 However,
several problems have occurred with many political issues between Russia and the 
EU. According to CERA, there are many areas of common interest: building new 
gas lines, development of new fields, compliance with the Kyoto protocol and
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cooperation in the nuclear industries. These issues should contribute to their 
interdependence.200
The growing interdependence due to these areas of common interest
between the EU and Russia may serve to stabilize the gas supply security for the
EU. However, the EU is also seeking to diversify its gas supplies from alternative 
gas suppliers to decrease its level of vulnerability to any disruption of gas imports 
from Russia.
5.2 EU-Russia Trade Balance and the Significance of Natural Gas
According to the Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat), 
Russia is the third largest trade partner with the EU and the EU is Russia’s largest 
trade partner, accounting for more than 52 % of its overall trade. In 2006 the goods 
exported from the EU to Russia were valued at 72.4 billion euros and the exports 
from Russia to the EU were valued at 140.6 billion euros.201 It is obvious that the 
trade deficit between the EU and Russia is almost 70 billion euros. In 2005 the 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) made by the EU in Russia was 8.9 billion euros, 
while Russian FDI in the EU was 4.1 billion euros.202
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The main items Russia imported from the EU were medicine, motor cars, 
communication equipment and electronics, while the main items the EU imported 
from Russia were raw materials such as oil, gas, coal, nickel, aluminum and 
copper.203 The Russian energy exports to the EU were  valued at 99.7 billion euros. 
In the EU’s total energy imports from Russia, natural gas has a very strategic 
position. Therefore, the asymmetry in the trade balance of EU and Russia is not 
only limited to a trade deficit, but also the level of the significance of the goods.  
Natural gas is one of the most strategic goods exported from Russia to the 
EU. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the increasing dependence on Russian 
gas is expected to affect the trade deficit in the following decades. Therefore, the 
EU is trying to establish a strong dialogue with Russia to reach a common interest 
in this asymmetrical interdependence relationship.
5.3 EU-Russia Dialogue
During the EU-Russia Summit in Paris in 2000, a bilateral energy dialogue 
was commenced to discuss their mutual dependencies. The basic idea behind the 
dialogue is a simple balancing of interests: Russians need more European 
investment to develop their energy resources while Europeans need secure long-
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term access to Russian oil and gas.204 As indicated in the Green Paper Towards a 
European strategy for the security of energy supply adopted by the European 
Commission on 30 November 2000, the idea of strengthening competition in the 
internal energy market and defending the sustainable development and guarantee 
external supply security has been discussed as a concrete action in the framework 
of the energy dialogue with Russia.205
Furthermore, in 2003 the communiqué On The Development of Energy Policy 
for The Enlarged European Union, its Neighbours and Partner Countries, issued 
by the European Commission, explains the aim of the EU and the expectations 
from Russia more vividly:
“For the European Union, it is important to maintain and enhance Russia’s 
role as   a supplier of gas and oil and to strengthen Russia as a secure and 
reliable supplier through technology transfers and investments to upgrade 
Russia’s energy infrastructure.”206
In 2001, the Russia-EU Summit identified a list of priority projects, on which 
feasibility studies could be co-financed by the European Union in the framework of 
the Trans-European Energy Networks (TEN) programme.207 The TEN programme
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included a number of electricity and gas infrastructure projects involving the 
Russian Federation. The most prominent project was the Northern European Gas 
Pipeline (NEGP) project, which is supported by TEN programmes.
It is expected that with the development of the EU-Russia relationship and the
integration of their economies, the EU and Russia could establish a transparent and 
strong relationship.208 Generally, there are two common interests. From the 
Russia’s perspective it is the need of investments in energy saving and energy 
efficiency. From the EU’s perspective it is securing an uninterrupted and safe 
energy supply from Russia with sensitivity to environmental issues.209 Therefore, 
the awareness of the need to further integrate the Euro-Russian gas market is 
growing, but there are differences in the priorities of Russian and the EU 
administrations regarding the gas issues. 
5.4 EU and Russian Energy Market
The EU is very interested in Russian energy sector reforms in order to 
establish interdependence between the EU and Russia. The European Commission, 
in its communiqué The Energy Dialogue between the European Union and the 
Russian Federation between 2000 and 2004 emphasizes that a relationship of 
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interdependence between the EU and Russia may include the “establishment
predictable trade rules, improvement networks and encourage investments by 
promoting a more stable and transparent legal framework and encourag[ing] key 
reforms in the Russian energy sector.” 210 On this topic, companies such as BP, 
Shell, Total and ENI have made significant investments in Russia.
According to the Centre for European Reform, the Russian energy market 
reforms are significant for the EU mainly for three reasons. First, Russia has a dual-
pricing policy in which there is a great difference between domestic and export 
prices of Russian gas. Therefore, the EU officials argue that this policy gives 
Russian industry and Gazprom an unfair advantage.211 This dual-pricing policy 
issue is so critical that it is considered as one of the main obstacles keeping Russia 
from WTO membership. 
The second reason is the growing inequality between the energy market 
liberalization of EU and the monopolist structure of the Russian market, which 
provides ultimate control of Gazprom. EU countries have decided to liberalize their 
gas markets for better standards of gas transactions. However, Russia supplies its 
EU customers under long-term supply contracts and with restrictions on re-export 
clauses that prohibit selling gas to any other third-party country. These contracts 
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and their clauses directly breach the EU’s single market rules.212 On the contrary, 
Gazprom is free to sell gas to different EU countries at different prices.
The third reason for the EU’s interest in Russian energy market reforms 
concerns Gazprom’s position as the single supplier of all Russian gas, which may 
endanger meeting the growing EU gas demand. The concerns have risen since the 
Presidential Decree in 2006 when Gazprom became the only gas export 
monopoly.213 Gazprom’s gas production has not increased in the last few decades 
and Gazprom has failed to invest enough in the development of new gas fields.
Therefore, Europeans believe that the investment in Russian gas infrastructure is an 
urgent requirement and market reforms may require that necessary measures be 
taken.214
Therefore, the future of interdependence between the EU and Russia would 
be very much affected by the Russian market reforms. If Russian market reforms 
are carried out with consideration to EU concerns, the gas issue may be the 
strongest instrument to contribute to their interdependence. 
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5.5 Energy Charter Treaty
In the energy sector, the EU and Russia are also engaged in the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT). The European Energy Charter Treaty was founded in 1994 
to provide the political, technical and promotion of East-West cooperation in the
energy sector. The ECT mainly covers the protection and promotion of foreign 
energy investments, free trade of energy goods based on WTO rules, freedom of 
energy transit via pipelines, energy efficiency and sensitivity to environmental 
issues and mechanisms to settle any disputes among states.215 Fifty-one countries 
with EU have signed the treaty and 46 of them have ratified it. Russia has signed,
but has not ratified it yet. Moreover, there are still ongoing negotiations on the 
transit protocol to regulate the transit issues of the signatory states.
The further ratification of the ECT by Russia is very significant for the EU. 
Article 8 of the Transit Protocol Draft requires Gazprom to open its pipeline system 
to other third-party suppliers like Turkmenistan, the Ukraine or the EU.216
Moreover, Article 20 offers to open internal distribution networks of the regional 
organizations like the EU to third countries. Therefore, one outcome of the 
ratification of ECT and its Transit Protocol is expected to be the integration of the 
energy systems of the EU and Russia.
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5.6 The Security of Russian Natural Gas Supplies for the EU
Despite the achievements in the EU-Russia dialogue and in the ECT, the 
Ukrainian gas crisis forced Europeans to reconsider the reliability of Russia as a 
secure supplier. It is clear that the Russian gas delivery reduction, risking a 
temporary supply disruption to Europe, would emphasize the need to build Russian 
pipelines bypassing the Ukraine as a result of concerns over energy security in 
Europe and dependence on imported gas.217 However, the geography of Russia’s 
existing pipeline export infrastructure through the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova to 
Europe may not be changed easily. According to Jonathan Stern, in his article The 
Russian Ukrainian Gas Crisis of January 2006, even when the NEGP is completed 
as an alternative route and will be in operation in 2010, the Ukraine will control 
around 70% of Russia’s gas export capacity to EU countries.218
The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis proved to Europe that it is not good for any 
country or region to become too dependent on a single supplier or a single supply 
route. Even disputes which do not directly involve third countries can affect those 
countries in the event of bilateral problems between a supplier and a customer 
which is also a transit country. All parties need to be part of international dispute 
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resolution procedures that are provided by the Energy Charter Treaty and its draft 
Transit Protocol, which Russia has yet to ratify.
5.7 Diversification of the Natural Gas Supply for the EU
Aside from the relations with Russia, the EU would diversify the sources of 
gas supplies to keep the share of Russian gas at a certain level in domestic gas 
consumption. The EU has two alternatives to Russian gas in order to diversify and 
secure its deliveries. The first is LNG and the second is the Caspian, Middle 
Eastern and North African gas supplies via new pipeline systems. 
5.7.1 The LNG Option
The natural gas system of the EU is very much dependent on gas supplies 
by pipelines. Therefore, the role of LNG in the future is very much dependent on 
the amount of future gas supplies by pipelines. According to CERA, if the Russian 
gas in the EU market is limited, LNG is expected to play a strategic role to secure 
and diversify the gas supply. By 2015, the total capacity of the re-gasification 
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terminals is planned to be 228 BCM.219 The additional deliveries of LNG are 
expected to come from the Atlantic Basin or the Middle East. 
Although the new pipeline projects and the current domination of pipelines 
in EU gas market could prevent LNG from being a major type of gas supply, LNG 
will meet the short-term gas shortages and diversify the gas supplies of the EU.220
5.7.2 New Natural Gas Pipeline Options for the EU
The Caspian and Middle Eastern countries have proven 35 trillion cubic 
meters of natural gas reserves and are the potential new gas suppliers for the EU.221
Iran, with its nearly 28 trillion cubic meters of proven gas reserves, is the first 
candidate to sell its gas to Europe. However, the political uncertainty and US 
embargo on Iran are the main obstacles for importing Iranian gas in the short-term 
and even in the medium term. The other gas import options are focused on the 
possible pipelines from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in 
the Caspian region and from Egypt, Syria and Iraq in the Middle-East. 
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The North African region provides the EU with 8% of its total natural gas 
consumption.222 The EU is willing to receive more gas from North Africa via two 
new pipeline projects. The other options for EU are the GALSI Pipeline that will 
supply gas from Libya to Italy with a capacity of 20 BCM223 and the Medgaz
Pipeline to transport Algerian gas to Spain with a capacity of 8 BCM.224 However, 
it is obvious that the additional quantities of North African gas are very limited and 
cannot meet the future demand of Europe.
In this context the most significant issue is the secure transportation of 
Caspian and Middle Eastern gas to Europe.  The EU aims at interconnecting its 
network with those of the other Caspian, Middle-Eastern and African gas producer 
countries. The Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) programme, 
established by the EU and other participating countries in 1995, aims at improving 
the security of Europe’s energy supply by promoting the regional integration of the 
oil and gas pipeline systems and facilitating their transport both within the region 
and towards the export markets of Europe and the West in general, while acting as 
a catalyst for attracting private investors and international financial institutions to 
these pipeline projects.225 Therefore the EU is proactively supporting the new 
pipeline projects in order to diversify its gas supplies. 
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5.8 The Significance of Turkey in the EU Security’s of Gas Supply
The EU considers Turkey to play a key role in a route that has access to the
Caspian, Middle Eastern, other Southern and Eastern resources and which could be 
carried to the West.226 In addition, Turkey consumed nearly 30 BCM of gas in 
2006,227 which makes it a prominent gas consumer in the region.  Another point 
that contributes to the significance of Turkey is its accession process to the EU. 
Moreover, the latest Turkish energy legislation, which was the adoption of law (no: 
4646) on 18 April 2001, has been inspired by the EU internal energy market. 
Turkey has ratified the Energy Charter Treaty in 2001, further contributing to its 
strategic position. 
In general, Turkey may assist the EU in securing gas supplies in two ways. 
Firstly, Turkey can be an alternative transit route for Russian gas to Europe via new 
pipeline projects. The construction of the Blue Stream II pipeline from Russia via 
Turkey to Hungary may be an alternative route to Belarus and Ukraine in 
transporting gas to Europe.228 It is important to say that this project would 
undermine the efforts of the EU to diversify its gas imports. Nevertheless, there are 
political obstacles for this project. As mentioned above, the US administration 
generally opposes the transportation of Russian gas via Turkey to Europe. Because, 
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it is believed that the transportation of Russian gas via Turkey may endanger the 
realization of the alternative gas pipelines connecting Turkey to other gas suppliers.
Secondly, Turkey may play a very strategic role for the EU’s diversification 
of gas supplies with new gas pipelines transporting gas from the Caspian and 
Middle East to Europe. The Green Paper, Towards a European strategy for the 
security of energy supply, by the European Commission, has emphasized the 
significance of Turkey in the transportation of Caspian and Middle Eastern gas to 
Europe.229 The new gas pipeline projects from Turkey to Europe have been 
considered as priority projects of the TEN programme.230
Furthermore, Turkey is also dependent on Russia, which supplies 66% of 
Turkish gas consumption via three separate pipelines.231 Therefore, Turkey shares 
similar concerns with the EU about being extensively dependent on Russian gas.232
The development and construction of new pipeline projects connecting the EU via 
Turkey to Caspian and Middle Eastern gas suppliers may be beneficial for both the 
EU and Turkey. 
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5.8.1 The Gas Pipelines and Projects connecting Turkey to Caspian and 
Middle East
Other than connection to Russia, Turkey is already connected to Iran and 
Azerbaijan by gas pipelines. The pipeline that carries gas from Iran to Turkey has 
been in operation since 2001 with a maximum capacity of 10 BCM. Moreover, in 
July 2007 Turkey and Iran signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
regarding the transportation of Iranian and Turkmen gas through Turkey to Europe 
and the Turkish development of three gas fields in the South Pars region of Iran.233
The Baku-Tblisi-Erzurum (BTE) Gas Pipeline that carries the Shah Deniz 
gas of Azerbaijan has been in operation since 2006 with a maximum capacity of 6.6 
BCM.234 The connection of the BTE with the Turkmen and Kazakh gas fields via a 
planned Trans-Caspian Pipeline was expected to be the accomplishment of the 
South Caucasus Gas Ring.235 However, in 2003 the 25-year gas sales agreement of 
Turkmenistan with Russia with a maximum capacity of 80 BCM remains the main 
obstacle for the construction of a Trans-Caspian Pipeline.236 Although there are 
uncertainties about the realization of the Trans-Caspian Pipeline Project, there is 
still hope for the South Caucasus Gas Ring to be another gate through which the 
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EU can reach Caspian gas sources. In addition, Azeri officials have warned the EU 
to give more attention to the construction of Trans-Caspian Pipeline, which may 
enhance the energy security of EU.237
Another region with abundant gas reserves is the Middle East. The Arab 
Gas Pipeline Project will transport Egyptian gas to Turkey. The Egypt-Syria 
section is in operation and the connection of the Syria-Turkey section will be 
another source of gas supplies.238 Furthermore, the possible connection of Iraq to 
Turkey by a separate pipeline or by a connecting pipeline from Iraq to the Syria 
section will contribute to the quantity of gas to be transported in Arab Gas Pipeline.
239
5.8.2 The Natural Gas Pipelines and Projects connecting Turkey with 
the EU
There are two major pipeline projects for transporting the gas supplies from 
Turkey to Europe. The first one is the interconnection of the Turkey-Greece-Italy
line. This project has been developed as a result of the studies undertaken for the 
interconnection of a natural gas grid for Turkey, Greece and Italy and the creation 
                                                
237 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, “Azerbaijan Advises the EU to Reduce Dependence on Russia”, (March 
22, 2007), http://www.ng.ru/ (accessed via Factiva on March 25, 2007).
238 EIA/DOE, “Country Analysis Briefs: Turkey”, (EIA/DOE, 2007) http://www.eia.doe.gov/
(accessed May 27,2007). 
239 CERA, European Gas Country Profiles-Turkey, p.1.
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of the Southeastern Gas Ring. The feasibility study of the project was funded by the 
EU TEN programme. The pipeline will transport 11 BCM of gas at the plateau 
level.240 The Turkey-Greece section was commissioned in 2007 (Map 5.1) and the 
Greece-Italy phase is expected to operate by 2012.
Map 5.1: Turkey-Greece Natural Gas Pipeline
Source: BOTAŞ
The second project is the Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria 
(NABUCCO) Gas Pipeline project. This pipeline route is planned to pass through 
Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to reach Austria, which will be a new gate to 
Europe (Map 5.2). The feasibility study of NABUCCO was funded at a certain 
level by the EU TEN Programme. The total capacity of NABUCCO will be 25-30 
                                                
240 BOTAŞ, “Turkey-Greece Natural Gas Pipeline Project”, (BOTAŞ, 2007) 
http://www.botas.gov.tr/ (accessed June 20, 2007).
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BCM of gas per year to Europe as well as to the Balkans. Natural gas will be 
supplied by the planned pipeline to the countries with emerging markets like 
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic and later on to the 
other European markets through Austria. The pipeline is expected to be in 
operation by 2009. 241
MAP 5.2: Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria (NABUCCO) Pipeline
Source: BOTAŞ
                                                
241 BOTAŞ, “Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria Natural Gas Pipeline Project 
(NABUCCO)”, (BOTAŞ, 2007) http://www.botas.gov.tr/ (accessed June 20, 2007).
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Turkey has a unique position through its geographical proximity to the 
supplier and consumer countries. Turkey has a huge consumption of gas with new 
infrastructure that may facilitate its role as secure and reliable energy corridor. The 
gas pipelines and projects connecting Turkey with major suppliers in the region and 
the connections of these projects to the EU gas transmission lines make Turkey a 
determining energy player in the region. 
On the other hand, negotiations between Turkey with the EU for full 
membership and the ongoing harmonization process to the EU acquis
communautaire make Turkey a unique country for EU to cooperate in gas 
transportation pipelines. Therefore, among other transit routes, the Turkish option 
may be the most secure alternative transit route for EU.  
5.9 Conclusion
Natural gas issue is the determining factor for interdependence between the 
EU and Russia. The Russians wish to secure the future gas demand together with 
decreasing dependence on transit routes in the Ukraine and Belarus. However, on 
the European side the security and the diversification of supplies to decrease the 
level of vulnerability for the dependence on Russian gas are predominant. 
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The gas issue is one of the most important topics of the EU-Russia dialogue 
and the negotiations within ECT member states. The achievements in these 
platforms to settle the gas issue on a healthy and transparent basis may be reached 
by a mutual understanding between the EU and Russia. On the other hand, Turkey 
has a very strategic role that intersects the interests of both the EU and Russia. 
Therefore Turkey may contribute to the rehabilitation of the interdependence 
between the EU and Russia. The EU may reach alternative gas sources via Turkey 
to Middle Eastern and Caspian sources and Russia may decrease its dependence on 
the problematic transit routes by constructing new pipelines via Turkey to the 
European gas market.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Natural gas is one of the most prominent hydrocarbon energy sources that 
has very much affect on international relations. The development and widespread 
usage of gas had been directly influenced by global historical incidents. The first 
rise of the use of natural gas during World War II urged some energy-hungry 
countries to switch their energy consumption to gas at a certain level. When the 
OPEC oil crisis of the 1970s forced oil dependence countries to find an alternative 
energy source, natural gas was one of the best choices. 
In the beginning of the 21st century, in global primary energy consumption, 
the share of natural gas has increased and is expected to continue to increase. The 
features of being the cleanest fossil fuel and its easy substitution with oil make 
natural gas a preferable energy source. The development of gas fields and the 
construction of new pipeline systems enhance the global natural gas market. 
97
Because of technological developments, the transportation of gas in liquefied form 
(LNG) enables short-term contracts and spot sales that are making the trade of 
natural gas easier.
The priorities of consumer and supplier countries vary from each other. On 
the consumer side, the relations of with suppliers are re-evaluated in terms of
securing the supplies and diversification of gas sources. On the supplier side, the 
optimization of export revenues with internal gas market regulations, securing the 
demand on the export markets and finding new markets for the diversification of 
exports are the most prominent priorities for gas producing countries. As analyzed 
in Chapter II, the unique gas relationship and interdependence between the EU and 
Russia is the most important one in the global gas market.
The EU-Russia interdependence could be simply explained that the EU is 
dependent on Russian gas and Russia is dependent on gas export revenues from the 
EU. The EU-Russia interdependence has a history of uneasy relationships which
have seriously affected the current gas debates between the EU and Russia. During 
the Soviet Union years, the development of the Russian gas industry and the first 
export transactions to Europe had been very much affected by the dynamics of the 
Cold War. Specifically, the Reagan sanctions of the 1980s aimed to prevent the
Soviets from making necessary investments in gas fields and exporting gas to 
European markets. However, despite the harsh conditions of the Cold War, the gas 
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pipelines connecting the Western Siberian fields to Europe were constructed by the 
Soviet Union and its partners in Western Europe. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gazprom had absolute control over 
gas export pipelines and major production fields with the ultimate support of the 
Russian state. Now, Gazprom is the leading global gas giant and has more gas 
reserves than any country in the world. Gazprom is the only Russian gas supplier to 
Europe. Therefore, in EU-Russia interdependence, Gazprom is located in the center 
of this relationship.
Gazprom’s gas exports to the EU are very critical for Russia in that the 
development and reconstruction of the Russian economy is financed by the energy 
gas export revenues at a certain level. Therefore Russia needs to take necessary 
measures to maintain its advantageous position and to decrease its vulnerability in 
its interdependence with the EU. Regarding gas production and transportation, the 
rehabilitation of the declining major fields in Western Siberia, the investments for
the development of new fields and the construction of new transmission lines and 
export pipelines are priority issues for Russia. In addition, Russia plans to diversify 
its export transit routes to Europe, which is currently very dependent on the 
Ukraine and Belarus.
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There are also critical issues of Russian domestic gas market, which include
deregulation and the gas pricing policy, which may affect interdependence with the 
EU. If the deregulation of Russian domestic market brings liberalization, it may be 
easier for the EU to invest in Russia. Moreover, Russia’s dual-pricing policy is not 
advantageous for Europeans who consumes gas at higer prices than Russian 
domestic prices. 
The domestic gas policy of the EU is another dimension of the EU-Russia 
gas relationship. In EU primary energy consumption, the share of natural gas is 
expected to increase, which is supported by studies conducted by the EU and IEA. 
The decline of the indigenous production and dependence on gas imports create 
great risks for the EU. Therefore the EU seeks to secure and diversify gas imports 
to decrease its vulnerability and import dependence on Russia. In the internal gas 
market, the EU is trying to fully integrate the gas markets of the member states. 
The ongoing liberalization and unbundling processes aims at creating more 
efficient and competitive markets to prevent monopolies. Therefore, in order to 
achieve a fully integrated market and secure gas supplies, a common European 
energy policy was perceived as the strongest instrument to deal with major gas 
issues. 
Moreover, there are concerns over the reliability of the Russian gas imports
to the EU. The European fear of using natural gas as a Russian foreign policy 
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instrument forces the EU to take the necessary measures for being less vulnerable 
to gas interruptions. The initiatives taken by Gazprom to invest in Europe have 
been perceived as Russian expansion over the European economy in the EU circles. 
In the EU-Russia gas relationship, the problems and concerns may be 
settled by mutual understanding and negotiations. The EU-Russia Dialogue and the 
ECT would be the convenient platforms to discuss these issues. The high level of 
cooperation between the EU and Russia may facilitate the establishing of business 
level relations with Gazprom and prominent European gas companies. As has been 
discussed in Chapter V, another opportunity for the EU and Russia is the strategic 
position of Turkey that may satisfy their priorities. Turkey has very strong ties with 
the EU and Russia which gives it a unique position in the region. For the EU, 
Turkey may contribute to the EU’s diversification of supply and secure transit 
pipelines connecting Middle Eastern and Caspian reserves to the EU. For Russia, 
Turkey may be an export outlet for Russian gas to the Mediterranean and provide 
an alternative transit route to Europe.
Consequently, natural gas is becoming a very strategic energy source for the 
future. Therefore, natural gas may enhance the interdependencies or may create 
conflicts among states. The most significant interdependence between the major 
gas consumer, the EU, and major supplier, Russia, should be maintained by mutual 
understanding and cooperation. In this relationship, Turkey, which has strong ties 
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with each of them, is the key country that may contribute to bringing this 
interdependence to a healthier level by satisfying the priorities of both sides. 
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